On August 7, the US Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 by an overwhelming 86-11 vote, granting President Trump discretionary authority to impose tariffs of up to 100 percent on goods from countries ranked among the top five importers of Russian oil and gas. India and China sit squarely in the bill’s crosshairs. The legislation now moves to the House of Representatives, which reconvenes on August 31, before it can reach the President’s desk. For India, this is not an abstract legislative development playing out in Washington. It is the latest escalation in a yearlong campaign of tariff pressure that has already pushed duties on Indian goods to 50 percent — the highest rate the US has imposed on any major trading partner — explicitly tied to New Delhi’s continued purchase of discounted Russian crude.
India’s position on this has been, and should remain, unambiguous: its energy choices are a matter of sovereign national interest, not a bargaining chip to be surrendered under pressure. As the Ministry of External Affairs stated plainly when Washington first escalated tariffs last August, “like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security,” adding that “the targeting of India is unjustified and unreasonable.” That framing deserves to be restated and defended, not softened, as this new bill advances through Congress.
The substantive case is straightforward. India imports the vast majority of its crude oil requirements; energy security for 1.4 billion people is not an optional policy preference but a structural necessity. When Russian crude became available at a significant discount following Western sanctions after 2022, India’s decision to purchase it was an act of economic rationality that any government responsible for its citizens’ energy costs and inflation trajectory would have made. Notably, India did not act in violation of international law — Russian oil purchases were not themselves sanctioned by the US or EU; only price-cap mechanisms and specific entities were targeted, and India largely operated within those parameters. The uncomfortable fact Washington’s tariff hawks prefer not to dwell on is that European nations continued importing Russian pipeline gas and other energy products throughout this same period, and the US itself has continued importing Russian uranium and fertilizers even as it sanctions India for oil purchases — a double standard Indian officials have pointed out directly.
There is also a fairness argument embedded in the bill’s own design that India should press hard on. The legislation does not automatically impose the 100 percent rate; it hands the US Trade Representative and the President broad discretion over the actual tariff level, backed by a waiver mechanism reviewed every 180 days. This is not a rule of law applied evenly — it is a lever of pressure applied selectively, wielded against whichever government Washington judges most susceptible to bending. India, unlike Russia itself, has no sanctions obligations under UN Security Council resolutions regarding these purchases. Being penalised more severely than the country actually under international sanctions, simply because India is easier to pressure than Moscow or, for that matter, than China, is not principled statecraft. It is coercive leverage dressed in the language of Ukraine solidarity.
None of this means India should be indifferent to the war in Ukraine or to Washington’s broader strategic anxieties. India has consistently called for a diplomatic resolution and voiced concern over civilian casualties at multilateral forums. But there is a meaningful difference between voicing concern and accepting economic coercion as the price of an independent foreign policy. India’s strategic autonomy — the principle that has guided its foreign policy since non-alignment and continues to guide its balancing act between Washington, Moscow and other major powers today — is precisely what is being tested here, and it should not be quietly abandoned because a Senate vote makes the cost of independence more visible.
There are also practical grounds for optimism that need not translate into complacency. The bill’s tariff ceiling has already been negotiated down once, from an earlier 500 percent proposal to the current 100 percent cap, reflecting recognition even within Congress that maximal pressure risks self-defeating economic disruption to US allies. Reports of ongoing US-India trade deal negotiations, with officials suggesting an agreement could be finalised within months, indicate that Washington’s own trade establishment understands the cost of pushing a major partner too far. India should continue engaging that parallel diplomatic track vigorously, while making clear through every available channel — the MEA, trade negotiators, and multilateral forums — that a strategic partnership cannot be built on periodic tariff threats over a sovereign energy policy that any nation in India’s position would reasonably pursue.
The choice facing New Delhi is not between capitulation and confrontation. It is between quiet, principled firmness — continuing to diversify energy sources where it serves India’s interests, while refusing to let Washington dictate the terms of that diversification through economic coercion — and a precedent where the United States can extract policy concessions from any partner simply by raising the tariff stakes high enough. India has resisted that pressure for a year. It should continue to.
DA Editorial Desk (Sara Debbarma)