A new US bill — soon to be signed by President Donald Trump — proposes tariffs of up to 100% on India for purchasing Russian oil. Yet the same legislation pointedly exempts low‑enriched uranium from any punitive measures, revealing a sharp contradiction in Washington’s approach to Russia and its partners.
The exemption is not accidental. Russia is the largest supplier of low‑enriched uranium to the United States, accounting for roughly one‑quarter of America’s foreign uranium imports. A chart from the US Energy Information Administration shows Russia at 26%, followed by France (18%), the UK (14%), the Netherlands (8%), and others (34%). With the US dependent on foreign uranium for 77% of its supply, cutting off Russian imports would directly threaten America’s nuclear energy sector.
Supporters of the bill argue that the tariffs on India are meant to deprive Vladimir Putin of oil revenues that fund the war in Ukraine. But critics highlight the inconsistency: while India faces steep penalties for long‑standing energy ties with Russia, the US continues importing a critical Russian commodity without interruption.
This contradiction fits a broader pattern. Analysts note that Trump has simultaneously expanded US–Russia trade and explored economic cooperation, even as he penalises other countries for maintaining their own ties with Moscow. When Trump announced a 25% “reciprocal tariff” on India earlier, no similar tariffs were imposed on Russia or North Korea.
A recent New York Times report adds another layer, stating that the White House is considering new business deals with Russia even before lifting tariffs — a move supporters frame as a peace incentive, while critics call it appeasement.