Army Chief Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran this week, carrying what multiple regional broadcasters describe as a US-drafted framework for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, places Pakistan in a familiar but increasingly delicate role: intermediary between two adversaries with little appetite for direct talks. It is a position Islamabad has occupied before, and one that offers real strategic value, but also carries risks that Pakistan’s own foreign policy establishment will need to navigate carefully.
The substance of the reported framework, a phased US withdrawal of its naval blockade and gradual sanctions relief in exchange for Iran fully reopening the strait and reining in allied groups conducting retaliatory operations, is a fairly standard sequencing arrangement of the kind seen in past de-escalation efforts. What makes it noteworthy is the channel through which it is being conveyed. Direct US-Iran communication remains effectively frozen, leaving intermediaries like Pakistan, and reportedly Qatar and Oman in parallel tracks, as the only viable means of transmitting proposals that neither side is willing to deliver directly.
For Pakistan, playing this role carries clear benefits. It reinforces Islamabad’s positioning as a country with genuine leverage in a region where it has historically punched above its diplomatic weight, partly through its long-standing ties with Gulf states and partly through channels built during earlier rounds of US-Iran tension. It also gives Pakistan’s military leadership, which retains primary control over foreign and security policy on matters like this, a visible role on the international stage at a moment when Islamabad’s global standing has been under pressure from multiple directions, including its own economic difficulties and tensions with India.
But mediation of this kind is a narrow tightrope. Iranian sources have already sought to downplay the significance of Munir’s visit, with a source cited by Tasnim insisting he carried no explicit threat or ultimatum from Washington, suggesting Tehran is keen to avoid the appearance of negotiating under pressure relayed through a third party, even as it engages with the substance of what that party is conveying. Any perception in Tehran that Pakistan is functioning as an extension of US pressure, rather than a neutral conduit, could complicate the very talks Islamabad is trying to facilitate.
There is also a structural risk in Pakistan’s approach: overreliance on shuttle diplomacy without either side directly engaging carries limits. Proposals relayed through intermediaries are easily deniable, slow to negotiate in detail, and vulnerable to being reshaped or misrepresented at each hop in the chain. If the framework Munir carried is to result in an actual reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and a durable reduction in tensions, at some point Washington and Tehran will likely need direct or near-direct engagement rather than relying indefinitely on Islamabad, Doha and Muscat to shuttle proposals back and forth. Pakistan’s role, valuable as it may be in keeping communication alive, is best understood as a bridge to eventual direct talks, not a permanent substitute for them.
— DA Editorial Desk (Sara Debbarma)